"None of plaintiffs' asserted legal claims can withstand defendants' motions to dismiss."

The fundamental misapprehension stems from the fact that no aspect of the plaintiffs Amended Complaint (complaint) that deals explicitly with her claims of fraud, her claims of "original source" including her "public disclosure" allegations and/or any of her other factual allegations are even mentioned let alone acknowledged for motion to

their claim that the towers were struck by high powered energy beams." Memorandum Decision pg. 8.

A search reveals that plaintiff did not use the expression "high powered energy beams." The above quotes clearly entail a fundamental misapprehension of plaintiff, Dr. Judy Wood's complaint, because, among other reasons, the Memorandum Decision makes no reference whatsoever to the fact that plaintiff filed a Request for Correction (RFC) dated March 16, 2007, together with additional supplements filed thereafter, to which NIST replied on July 27, 2007 and on January 10, 2008, all of which, collectively, comprise the "information" upon which her status as either an original source for FCA purposes or a relator who need not qualify as an original source because she is the author of the disclosed information and her standing as having "direct and independent" information are based. Plaintiff, Dr. Judy Wood's said information - her RFC - are nowhere mentioned in the Memorandum Decision. This bears some emphasis here because the source of her information, her RFC, is simply not at all taken in consideration, much less accorded veracity, as it must, in the context of a motion to dismiss. Instead, the Memorandum Decision went so far as to dispute plaintiffs contentions. That is not the court's function in a motion to dismiss.

To be sure, this court did properly reference the fact that what is mentioned in the above paragraph, namely the RFC and its related information, are properly before this court and should, therefore, have been considered as a part of the complaint. The Memorandum Decision contains Footnote 15, pg. 10, stating:

"The sufficiency of the pleadings is determined by examination of the complaint, the exhibits attached thereto, and matters incorporated by reference therein. Other independent submissions made by the defendants, with regard to the jurisdictional challenge, were not considered in assessing the legal adequacy of the complaints"

By virtue of that language, it is clear that Dr. Judy Wood's RFC must, of necessity, be considered an integral part of the complaint and the information relied on for purposes of jurisdiction under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. €3729 et seq. (FCA). Not only that, the allegations are to be deemed true.

In addition to that fundamental misapprehension, the following quoted elements of the Memorandum Decision rise to the mandated level for granting a Rule 59(e) reconsideration motion:

"The allegations in plaintiffs' complaints are based entirely on information made publicly available through NIST's administrative investigation, the administrative report resulting therefrom (z.e.NCSTAR 1), a prior civil action and various media accounts." Memorandum Decision pg. 7.

Their personal hypothesis about what should be concluded from publicly disclosed information does not qualify either of them as an original source of information in order to sustain an individual FCA claim on behalf of the Government. See, Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1159; see also, New York Med. Coll., 252 F. 3d at 121-22." Memorandum Decision pg. 8.

To state a FCA claim, plaintiffs must sufficiently allege the defendants knowingly presented a false or fraudulent claim; knowingly made or used a false record or statement to get a fraudulent claim paid; or knowingly made or used a false record or statement to decrease their obligation to pay the Government. The theory of plaintiffs' lawsuit is that the defendants violated the FCA because they were not entitled to any renumeration for the services they rendered to NIST since NIST ultimately failed to conclude, consistent with plaintiffs' hypothesis, that the Twin Towers was destroyed by the military's directed energy weapons." Memorandum Decision pg. 10.

Plaintiff simply has not been heard.Ê She did not rely on a "personal hypothesis;"

and it is improper to refer to her claims as such in that doing so affirmatively rej ects the truthfulness of her RFC in the context of a motion to dismiss. This is incongruent with motion to dismiss protocol. Plaintiff presented a detailed RFC, containing forensic information, to which NIST replied by making certain additional admissions concerning its knowledge of the defendants' involvement in the development of DEW. NIST did not

refer to her RFC as "her personal hypothesis" and thus there was absolutely no basis for the court to have done so; especially since, as indicated, for motion to dismiss purposes her claims are to be deemed true.

To be sure, plaintiff has stated that the defendants herein are aware, by virtue of their involvement in areas of specialty that are directly related to the manufacture, development and testing of DEW, of the lethal effects associated with their use, and/or their involvement and testing of the effects of fire or fire prevention. The plaintiffs claims are, then, in the nature of forensic science where she articulated an abundance of effects that could only be explained by DEW and not fire. When that set of facts is added to the fact that the defendants are knowledgeable about such weapons and their effects and also knowledgeable concerning the properties of fire, the elements of fraud are not only clear and palpable, they are entirely different from the way this court characterized her claims.

That merits reconsideration so that, at a minimum, what she has actually claimed should be properly referenced in the court's decision and findings. As things now stand, the Memorandum Decision does not address plaintiffs claims. This assertion follows from the fact that, among others, there is no connection between the court's articulation of the "original source" doctrine and the actual "information" upon which plaintiffs qui tam case is based. Dr. Judy Wood filed an RFC with NIST on March 16, 2007 and that is her "information."

Her complaint plainly confirms this characterization by the exact content of paragraphs 7 through 12 of her complaint.

It may be that plaintiffs complaint was not clear enough in this respect. For instance, it is true that plaintiff made a reference, based upon "information and belief," that DEW are and remain highly classified, secret instrumentalities of the military apparatus of the Armed Forces of the United States of America." That was not, however, an allegation of who did what, nor was it intended to convey any such claim. To the extent that that language may have led to the misapprehension hereinabove articulated, the proper remedy would be dismissal without prejudice so as to make sure the defendants know what they're being charged with having done.

It is respectfully submitted, however, that the defendants do know what they are charged with, all as was more fully elaborated on in, among other documents, the Affirmation of the undersigned (Docket # 90), which not only indicated clearly what this case is about, it also confirmed that defendants know what they are called upon to defend.

The jurisdictional elements of the FCA⁴ confirm that the inquiry into whether a court may hear a qui tam relator's claim has three parts: (1) Have the allegations made by the plaintiff been 'publicly disclosed'? (2) If so, is the lawsuit 'based upon' that publicly disclosed information? (3) If so, is the plaintiff an 'original source' of the information?" United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 859 (7^th Cir. 1999). See also U.S. et rel. McDermott v. Genentech Inc., 2006 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 90586 (D.ME). The burden is on relator to show that she satisfies this jurisdictional requirement.ÊÊ Because the Memorandum Decision did not address plaintiff s information, it cannot properly be said that she has had her information assessed in accordance with the applicable standards. Moreover, it is here asserted that were the actual information upon which plaintiff relies to have received consideration, as it has

Page 2 of the Memorandum of Decision states:

"According to plaintiffs, the evidence demonstrates that the destruction of the World Trade Center Towers was caused by a United States secret military "directed energy weapon."

That claim is inaccurate. Plaintiff makes no assertion whatsoever about whether or not the directed energy weapons (DEW) that were used to destroy the World Trade Center (WTC) are, in fact, those of the United States military, secret or otherwise. Plaintiff does not say who destroyed the WTC. Plaintiffs case is a forensic evaluation of what destroyed the WTC and it arises in the context of challenging NIST's findings and the manner in which the contractors, the defendants herein, engaged in fraudulent work. Clearly, then, there exists, at present, a fundamental misapprehension in that plaintiff makes no claim at all about who perpetrated the destruction of the WTC.

2. NCSTARl report constitutes a "fraudulent document":

Page 4 of the Memorandum Decision contains the following statement:

"They contend that the NCSTAR 1 report constitutes a "fraudulent document," in that it conceals the true cause for the collapse of the Twin Towers. "

It is true that Dr. Wood's complaint can be understood to make that claim. However, there is more to it than that. NIST's mandate was to investigate how and why the towers "collapsed;" yet, NIST admitted to Dr. Wood that they did not even investigate that issue, let alone answer it. They could have because they had, as contractors, those who are said to have expertise in the lethality effects of DEW. That is what Dr. Wood alleges as fraudulent. This claim is nowhere articulated in the Memorandum Decision. The concise version of plaintiff s actual claims is as follows:

a. NIST and the contractors undertook a years long fraudulent scheme wherein and whereby millions of dollars were spent on obfuscation.

b. The final product NCSTARl was a 10,000 page tome that purported by its title and by NIST's mandate to describe why and how the Twin Towers' collapsed". Yet NIST admitted to plaintiff that it did not investigate the actual collapse, let alone analyze the destruction of the WTC.

c. The Twin Towers were destroyed by DEW.

d. The defendants are experts in the effects of DEW, directly or indirectly.

e. Nondisclosure that DEW destroyed the WTC was either overtly fraudulent or the result of willful blindness.

3. Pg 4 of the Memorandum decision also "furthering the deception" states:

"Plaintiffs maintain that the alleged fraudulent nature of the investigation has furthered the deception, perpetrated upon the masses, that the WTC was demolished as a result of terrorists plowing two commercial airplanes, filled with thousand of gallons of jet fuel, directly into the Twin Towers at a high rate of speed.(footnote 7)

(footnote 7) Plaintiffs' lawsuits make no allegation with regard to the hijacking of

United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in a field just outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania, or the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 77, which was crashed into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia."

The quoted language in fact represents a misapprehension of plaintiff s case. Her claim is based on forensic science concerning the cause of destruction of the World Trade Center complex. The quoted language is utterly out of place with respect to plaintiffs claims. Note, too, that footnote 7 is obviously not a part of this case or of plaintiff's claim. Yet, by including footnote 7, the depth of the court's misapprehension of plaintiffs actual claim is further revealed.

4. This is not a case involving the assassination of President Kennedy or moon landings:

Page 8 of the Memorandum Decision states:

"Such an argument, based solely on publicly available information, could no more support a federal lawsuit to advance an alternative theory regarding the assassination of President Kennedy, or whether men ever actually landed on the moon."

It is here asserted that the quoted language serves no purpose in this case and is not at all a part of the framework of what plaintiff alleges. In fact, the quoted language is consistent with the perception that plaintiff herein is engaging in what is pejoratively referred to as "conspiracy theory."ÊÊÊ Once again, this is not a case involving allegations of "who" destroyed the WTC. As such, this case, on its face, is not one claiming to involve "a conspiracy". That is not what this case is about and it is considered unfortunate that the case may be viewed that way. However, by virtue of not assessing the actual information upon which this case is based, it is a little more understandable how plaintiff and her claims could have been perceived as involving conspiracy claims. It does no such thing. The misapprehension cries out for correction sooner rather than later.

By virtue of not referencing plaintiffs actual information and actual claims of fraud, the quoted statement lacks a necessary foundation and is further evidence of the clear need for reconsideration of this case.

7. Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleadings standard:

It follows that by virtue of not having considered the plaintiffs actual information, that the following declaration found on page 12 of the decision cannot be accurate:

"Plaintiffs have not only failed to comply with the liberal pleading standards applicable to a consideration of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), they have also failed to meeting the stricter pleading standard under Fed.RCiv.P. 9(b)"

Plaintiff adequately addressed the Rule 9(b) issues in her responsive pleadings to the motion to dismiss. The court's reasoning cannot be said to have properly addressed that reasoning because of the exclusion of the actual information upon which plaintiffs claims of fraud are based.

Moreover, the proper remedy for a lack of particularity would certainly include a dismissal without prejudice so as to afford an opportunity to provide those particulars. However, as noted in plaintiffs submittals, the defendants' herein are corporate defendants and they have dominion and control over the information from which additional particulars could be found. It was also noted that their claims for particularity did not prevent them from actually and formally "answering" plaintiffs claims, thus putting paid to the claim they needed additional particulars.

8. Footnote 19

The final request for reconsideration concerns the following quoted portion of Footnote 19, pg. 15:

"A belief, no matter how incredible, that the WTC was destroyed using secret exotic weaponry, does not give rise to even a colorable claim for relief. All plaintiffs, as well as the attorney for the plaintiff here, are hereby warned that filing further successive untenable actions may result in the imposition of monetary or other serious sanctions."

It is respectfully submitted that based on the fundamental misapprehension of plaintiff's claims, as articulated hereinabove, the quoted portion of Footnote 19 should be deleted from the court's Memorandum Decision. The plaintiff is a materials engineering scientist who articulated in forensic detail the nature of her claims. Her actual claims were not mentioned by the court, hence the quoted portion of footnote 19 has no actual application to her. Moreover, the quoted portion of footnote 19 utterly eradicates all semblance of compliance with motion to dismiss protocol whereby, as noted above, a court must "accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint," Shipping Fin. Servs.Corp. v. Drakos, 140F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Scheuerv. Rhodes. 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974)), but refrain from "drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting [jurisdiction]," APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 623 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Instead, the court has basically rejected plaintiffs forensic work, even without specifically referring to that work as the basis of her "information". The quoted part of footnote 19 clearly establishes that plaintiff merits the reconsideration she has requested.

Equally demonstrative of fundamental misapprehension is the court's reference to future claims that, by definition, fall outside the scope of the issues presented in this case and therefore should not be a part of the decisional framework. It is considered improper, inappropriate and an overreach to disparage what the party to this lawsuit and her counsel might do in future cases and controversies they might engage in, which is all the more